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Abstract
Whether a country is able to effectively address collective action problems is a critical
test of its ability to fulfill the demands of its citizens to their satisfaction. We study one par-
ticularly important collective action problem: the environment. Using a large panel dataset
covering 25 years for some countries, we find that, overall, citizens of European countries
are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if (a) more environmental
policies are in place and if (b) expenditures on the environment are higher, but environmen-
tal taxes are lower. The relation between environmental policy and life satisfaction is not
as pronounced. The evidence for effects of environmental quality on both satisfaction with
democracy and life satisfaction is not very clear, although we find evidence that citizens
value personal mobility (in terms of having a car) highly, but view the incidence of trucks as
unpleasant. We also document that parents, younger citizens, and those with high education
tend to care more about environmental issues than do non-parents, older citizens, and those
with low education.
JEL Classification: K32, P16, Q21, Q28.
Keywords: collective action problems, environmental economics, environmental policy, en-
vironmental quality, satisfaction with democracy.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study how the resolution of an important economic problem – ensuring high
environmental quality – plays a role for how citizens perceive the quality and performance of
the political system they live in. There is a lot of public discussion about the importance of
environmental issues, and it is evident that there is a greater popular awareness for environmen-
tal problems today than some decades ago (Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003; Tanguay et al.
2004). What is less known, however, is: Just how important is the environment to individuals’
perceptions of the performance of the regime they live in, taking into account that individuals
also want to achieve other, potentially conflicting goals such as economic prosperity? Answering
this question is critical because most environmental policies are costly. Therefore, their ultimate
acceptance will hinge on the economic value the public assigns to such policies.
Even though most individuals recognize the collective benefits of treating the environment
carefully, individual considerations are likely to speak against such actions. In economic terms,
the environment is a classic case of a public good, for which a collective action problem in the
sense of Olson (1965) arises: The marginal collective benefits of adopting careful actions, vis-a-
vis the environment, outweigh by far the marginal private benefits (even though the latter vary
across individuals). Importantly, rational individuals are aware of this wedge between what they
know would be good for society, and what the optimal individual course of action is. Thus, they
know that environmental quality tends to be undersupplied. Consequently, the main hypothesis
that we test is that citizens yearn for an effective resolution of this dilemma. Because solutions to
collective action problems are available only through a broad consensus on policies, the success
a country has at tackling collective problems like the environment is a matter, among other
things, of how well a political system works. Therefore, we operationalize the research question
by asking more specifically: Are citizens more satisfied with the way their political system works
when more environmental policies are established and/or environmental quality is higher? And
how much do they care, compared to other goals, such as personal or country-wide economic
welfare?
To answer these questions, we choose as the primary dependent variable a direct measure
of citizens’ views on the performance of their respective countries. This measure is ‘satisfaction
with democracy’ (SWD), a survey measure which is available for a wide range of countries.
Satisfaction with the way democracy works is not an indicator of system legitimacy per se.
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Rather, it is one indicator of support for the performance of a democratic regime widely used
in political science. Survey measures such as life satisfaction and happiness are very popular in
economic research (see, among many others, Frey and Stutzer 2000, 2002; Di Tella et al. 2003;
Alesina et al. 2004; Blanchflower and Oswald 2004; and Bjørnskov et al. 2007). Because of
its comparable validity and usefulness (Linde and Ekman 2003), SWD and related measures
are also increasingly applied (see, among others, Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004; and
Wagner et al. 2009). SWD does not attempt to capture whether people support the principles
of democracy, but rather how they judge it to work in practice in their actual experience. It is
a summary indicator (Clarke et al. 1993) that measures satisfaction with ‘the constitution in
operation’ (Klingemann 1999).1 As explanatory variables for SWD (besides standard individual
and country-level economic controls) we use a broad array of environmental policy and quality
variables. We compile a very large panel dataset, covering 16 countries in the time period from
1976 through 2000 (though we do not have data for each country-year combination).
We find that environmental policy and quality matter to citizens in statistically and econom-
ically important ways. Over the whole sample period, more comprehensive environmental policy
is associated with higher SWD. For instance, the increase of the number of environmental policy
measures by one standard deviation is on average associated with a rise in SWD equivalent to
an increase in GDP growth by one standard deviation. Environmental expenditures also are
positively associated with SWD, while taxes tend to have a negative effect. For instance, by
increasing environmental expenditures (measured as a share of GDP) by one percentage point,
SWD for the average citizen is estimated to increase by about a quarter of a standard deviation.
Our findings are robust to controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and numer-
ous time-varying controls on both the country level and the individual level. We also present
evidence, using three distinct sample splits, that some citizens (such as parents, young citizens,
and those that are highly educated) tend to care more about environmental issues than others.
In sum, the results suggest that citizens, or at least important subsets of them, expect from
the political system that it allows implementation of policies that address the environmental
collective action problem.
With these findings, the paper relates to the literature on political economy, governance,
and happiness. Some evidence now exists that good government (measured by broad concepts
1Some work following Anderson and Guillory (1997) has considered political system determinants of SWD,
but so far no study has considered the implications of specific policy measures.
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such as effectiveness of government, rule of law, lack of corruption, voice and accountability, and
political stability) is associated with greater happiness, or individual life satisfaction (Helliwell
and Huang 2008). Helliwell (2006) and Layard (2006) provide summaries of related results
on the relationship between public policies and happiness. However, we do not know of any
study that has considered the government’s success in implementing policies addressing specific
collective action problems. Perhaps closest to our study are some economics papers that have
studied environmental quality (but not policy) as a determinant of happiness. One line of
work has considered specific environmental amenities. For example, Van Praag and Baarsma
(2005) use the happiness approach to value airport noise. A second line of work studies broader
environmental measures. Welsch (2006) presents evidence that air pollution, such as nitrogen,
particles, and lead, is negatively associated with subjective well-being for ten European countries
(see also Welsch 2002). Welsch (2007) expands the analysis to a cross-section of 54 countries and
calculates the marginal rate of substitution of income for abatement. Rehdanz and Maddison
(2005) examine the relationship between climate and happiness in an empirical analysis using
data of 67 countries. They find that happiness increases with higher mean temperature in the
coldest month and decreases with higher mean temperatures in the hottest month as well as
that it decreases with a bigger number of months with very little precipitation of rain.2
All of these studies use either purely cross-sectional data, or, where they use panel data, they
average happiness over all individuals in a country. However, this assumes homogenous policy
effects, reduces the degrees of freedom substantially, and requires the cardinality of satisfaction
scores, making it a less than ideal method for the question under study. One prior study that uses
individual-level data is by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy (2007). However, their investigation of
the relationship between individual happiness and attitudes towards ozone pollution and species
extinction is limited to British data.
Our findings on environmental quality are broadly consistent with these studies. However,
our results add to the existing literature in four important dimensions. First, this is the first
study, to the best of our knowledge, to consider SWD as a measure of how much individuals
care about the environment. Because environmental problems are by their nature collective
2As such, the present paper and the cited studies can also be interpreted as complementary to the existing, rich
literature in economics that has addressed the economic value of specific environmental amenities. See Freeman
(1985) and Environmental Protection Agency (2000) for surveys. Standard methods include, on the one hand,
revealed preference methods and hedonic pricing (Viscusi 1993; Bockstael et al. 1987; Rosen 1974), including
those based on recreation demand estimation (Bockstael and McConnell 1983; Morey et al. 1993), as well as,
on the other hand, stated preference (contingent valuation) methods (Mitchell and Carson 1989;, Portney 1993;
Hanemann 1994; Diamond and Hausman 1994).
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problems, understanding variations in perceptions of the quality of the constitution in operation
provides insights beyond those available from studying individual well-being. (We show in the
robustness section that environmental policy and quality also matter for happiness.) Second, no
study has evaluated the relationship between environmental policy measures and any satisfaction
variable. Policies and quality may be related, but there may be important time lags, and citizens’
evaluations of the effectiveness of the political system should take into account whether or not
the right policies are in place. Third, we use what is, to our knowledge, the largest panel dataset
of SWD to date. Fourth, we test for effects that are heterogenous across sub-groups of the
population which is something papers using country-level averages cannot do.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses, describes
the data, and discusses how our method differs from, and hopefully improves on, approaches
employed in related studies. Section 3 presents the findings. Section 4 concludes this study.
2 Hypotheses, data and methodology
We begin by deriving our hypotheses. We then discuss our dependent variable(s). Then, we
present our key explanatory variables and our controls. Finally, we describe our estimation
strategy.
2.1 Hypotheses
We test three simple ideas. First, economic theory suggests that collective action problems are
never fully resolved. In particular, public goods such as environmental quality will generally be
undersupplied, i. e., collective marginal benefits will be greater than the collective marginal costs
even when private marginal benefits and costs are already equated (Olson 1965). This results
in free-riding and a tendency for environmental degradation (that is, the production of a public
bad) among what Olson (1965) termed as latent groups. Most countries fall into this category.3
Citizens recognize these collective action problems. This implies that individuals would prefer
higher environmental quality than is usually provided. While Olson (1965) proposed some
specific mechanisms for how participation can be induced in an otherwise latent group (such
as through selective incentives, through repeated interaction, and as by-products of the actions
3In Olson’s (1965) analysis, group size plays an important role, but virtually all countries are so big that
individual benefits from environmental quality, net of costs due to contributing to this public good, are most
likely to be negative throughout.
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of groups actually created for other purposes), we generally hypothesize that political systems
that are more successful at resolving such problems of collective action will command more
respect from their citizens. For this result to hold, we only need to assume that individuals
regard environmental quality as a good thing. Specifically, our first hypothesis is that higher
environmental quality leads to greater satisfaction with the way democracy works.
Citizens may also expect, more concretely, from the ‘constitution in operation’ that it allows
the government to provide (at least partially) effective ways towards a resolution of the collective
action problem. That is, because citizens recognize that because their country is not a unitary
actor and may, thus, face a collective action problem, they may perceive it as desirable to have
external solutions or at least boundary conditions for individual actions imposed by the govern-
ment. Some frictions in the political system are needed to generate an empirical relationship
between policy and SWD. To see this, suppose that voters have single-peaked preferences over
environmental policy and that environmental policy is determined by politicians to cater to the
preferences of citizens (Downs 1957). In principle, in a perfectly functioning political system,
under majority voting, the median voter will thus ‘set’ environmental policy (Black 1948). There
would then exist no relation between policy and SWD (if one assumes that the SWD survey
sample is representative enough to bracket the median voter): Each country, at each point in
time, is effecting the policy regarded as optimal by the median voter. However, imperfections of
the political system may lead to deviations from that optimum. First, elected candidates do not
necessarily deliver on their campaign promises. Second, policies are not set continuously, and
lobbying activities may lead to both overprovision (if environmental lobbyists are more power-
ful) or underprovision (if companies favoring laxer environmental standards carry the day), see
Grossman and Helpman (2001). While we do not develop a formal theoretical model in this
paper, it seems plausible that on balance the political system would lead to an underprovision
of policies compared to what a full resolution of the collective action problem would require.
Thus, we also test the idea that environmental policy is generally seen as an important aspect
of a well-functioning democracy and will, therefore, also lead to more SWD.
In summation, our two core hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1: More environmental policy is associated with higher SWD.
Hypothesis 2: Better environmental quality is associated with higher SWD.
Third, citizens’ preferences over environmental issues may not only differ across countries
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but also within countries. Many environmental problems are inherently long-term challenges.
A purely selfish individual might simply not care about what happens after he or she dies.
Even rational economic models frequently assume, however, that individuals have a bequest
motive, as they think about the welfare of their offspring. Issues of sustainable development and
preserving the environment for future generations may, therefore, differentially affect individuals’
perceptions of the way democracy works. If individuals expect environmental problems to mainly
concern themselves only in the long run (or even concern only next generations, not their own)
this would suggest that (i) younger citizens and (ii) those with children should care more about
environmental policy.
Hypothesis 3a: Younger citizens’ SWD reacts more strongly to environmental policy
and quality than SWD of their older counterparts.
Hypothesis 3b: Parents’ SWD reacts more strongly to environmental policy and
quality than SWD of non-parents.
Finally, one might argue that the awareness for such complex, long-term problems as the
environment, and the awareness of what politics does to address them, might increase with
educational attainment. Thus, one could expect a stronger reaction among higher educated
citizens.
Hypothesis 3c: Higher educated citizens’ SWD reacts more strongly to environmental
policy and quality than SWD of their lower educated counterparts.
2.2 Data
All our data, including the hand-collected items, will be available to other researchers upon
publication of this study. Detailed information on all data used can be found in the Data
appendix.
2.2.1 Dependent variable
The primary dependent variable of our empirical analysis is a 4-point scale measure of SWD on
an individual level from the Eurobarometer survey, based on the question ‘On the whole, are you
very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy
works in our country? ’. The Eurobarometer is a biannual survey launched in 1970 (turning into
7
a quarterly survey in 2000) and covers questions on opinions and basic attitudes regarding the
EU and its institutions, politics, economy and society. The question on SWD was first asked in
a core of 9 countries in 1973, continued to be asked of respondents from these countries in 1976,
and was expanded after 1980, in a stepwise manner, to include respondents from an additional
7 countries. We obtain these data from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1970-2002.
This an integrated set of data covering harmonized variables for the years 1970 through 2002
that allow a cross-time (and cross-country) comparison. The question on SWD was not asked in
every survey round in each country since 1973. However, as Table 1 shows, we have information
from 313 country-years (covering responses from more than 570, 000 respondents).4
As Figure 1 shows, there is substantial variation across countries in terms of the average
level of SWD. Luxembourg exhibits the highest SWD in the whole EU, with a mean of 2.90.
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria (all values above 2.69) also do very well in terms
of satisfying their citizens’ expectations towards democracy. Ireland, Sweden and Germany are
all slightly above the EU average of 2.58 (calculated as average of country-averages). The larger
economies, such as the United Kingdom, France and Spain have values below the average. The
country with the lowest levels of average satisfaction is Italy with an average of 1.96.
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]
SWD is a survey measure, and as such it is, in principle, subject to the same criticisms
as any survey. Our approach to using this dependent variable is pragmatic: SWD has been
validated and applied widely (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Linde and Ekman 2003), and we
take its usefulness as a starting point.5 Note also that, in contrast to contingent valuation
approaches, the subjects we study answered the questions about their SWD independently of a
specific policy context. Thus, our approach does not require that the respondents are aware of
any cause-and-effect relationship. It is not even necessary that respondents know the level of
environmental quality. Therefore, our approach is cognitively less demanding than contingent
valuation, and whatever relationship we find cannot be caused by strategic answers.
As an alternative dependent variable, we use overall well-being. This will allow us to contrast
our findings for SWD with the related findings in this domain. The Eurobarometer includes a
4In our regression analysis below, we have to exclude all observations from the 9 country-years from 1973
since no (comparable) information on labor market status is available. We further lose some observations due to
missing information on several individual-level control variables.
5See Canache et al. (2001) for a critique of SWD and Anderson (2005) for a response to that critique.
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question on life satisfaction: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?, and another one on happiness ‘Taking all
things together, how would you say things are these days – would you say you’re very happy, fairly
happy, or not too happy these days? ’. Since the number of available observations is substantially
higher in the case of the former question (648, 083 versus 134, 607), we use this 4-point scale
variable to capture overall well-being, and refer to this variable as life satisfaction (LS) below.
Figure 1 indicates that SWD and LS are related, but by no means equivalent. The correlation
between the two variables on the individual level is 0.331. On the aggregate level, we see that
SWD is typically somewhat lower and more volatile than LS.
2.2.2 Environmental policy
We collect information from different sources in order to capture environmental policy with
different measures: (i) the existence of a wide array of certain policy measures, (ii) revenues
from environmental taxes as percentage of GDP, (iii) public expenditure on the environment as
a percentage of GDP, and (iv) the share of votes for green parties.
Information on the existence of certain policy measures to protect the environment are
collected from Binder (2002). These policy measures essentially cover the full spectrum of
environmental regulation: from subsidies for renewable energy to environmental ministries, from
environmental labels to the existence of a nature conservancy act.6 For each policy measure, a
binary variable is defined which is equal to one if a country had implemented this measure in a
given year. For example, the variable energy/CO2 tax is equal to one when a country had an
energy tax in place in a given year and zero otherwise. We then calculate a summary measure,
which is simply the number of all implemented policy measures in a given year. It encapsulates
the degree to which a country has established a comprehensive set of environmental policy
measures. It is apparent from Figure 2 that there is a tremendous variation in the implementation
of environmental policies across the sample countries. The Netherlands started early and had
implemented all 16 policy measures by 1999. In contrast, Belgium was a late adopter and still
lags far behind at the end of the sample period.
6We read this information from the tables and graphs in Binder (2002). The full list of the 16 available policy
measures is as follows: quota for electricity from renewable energy sources, energy/CO2 tax, packaging rules,
sustainability council, subsidy for electricity from renewable energy sources, energy efficiency labels, environmen-
tal plan, ecolabels, environmental office, environmental expert council, general environmental act, environmental
reporting rules, waste disposal act, environmental protection as a constitutional goal, nature conservancy act,
and a soil protection act.
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[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The data on revenues from environmental taxes and government expenditure on environ-
ment protection (both measured as a percentage of GDP) are from the database of Eurostat.
The development of these measures per country is also depicted in Figure 2. Unfortunately,
these variables are not available for the whole sample period. Information on taxes is missing
completely before 1980, and in the case of expenditures, even before 1990. Notably, the level
of government expenditure on environment protection is lower throughout than the revenues
from environmental taxes. The revenues from environmental taxes, as a percentage of GDP, are
in a range from 1.54% (Spain 1989) to 5.39% (Denmark 1999). Expenditures are in between
0.2% (Sweden, 1995 − 1999) and 1.5% (Luxembourg, 1992 − 1994). Of course, the ability of
tax revenues (alone) to capture the degree of environmental friendliness may be limited. For
instance, low revenues can either be due to little use of environmental taxes, or due to a broad
and effective use of such taxes, where high tax rates have altered the citizens’ behavior. How-
ever, when we employ this variable below, we control for other environmental policy measures,
allowing us to draw ceteris paribus conclusions.
Finally, we have data on the percentage of total cabinet posts held by green parties (weighted
by days) from the Comparative Political Data Set I. This variable serves as a control variable,
and we have per se no clear hypothesis on its ceteris paribus effect on SWD. We think of this
variable as a good proxy for the degree of environmental awareness, and we will use it as a
covariate to check the robustness of our results.
As Table 2 shows, environmental policy and environmental expenditures are (perhaps sur-
prisingly) essentially uncorrelated. Environmental taxes are positively correlated with both the
summary policy measure and environmental expenditures. As expected, we see that the higher
the share of green parties in the cabinet, the higher the number of implemented environmental
policy measures and the higher the environmental expenditures.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
10
2.2.3 Environmental quality
To measure environmental quality we use data on (i) emissions7 and on (ii) road network and
traffic. In particular, we use data from the OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2004 on
emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile or-
ganic compounds (VOC) and carbon dioxide (CO2). The main human sources of SOx are from
burning fossil fuels, smelting and paper manufacture. SOx emissions cause adverse effects on
respiratory systems of humans and animals, and damage to vegetation. In particular, they con-
tribute to acid deposition and thus have negative effects on aquatic ecosystems. NOx emissions
– mainly due to the burning of fossil fuels at high temperatures – play an important role in the
production of photochemical oxidants and of smog, and contribute, together with SOx, to acid
precipitation. CO interferes with the absorption of oxygen by red blood cells and causes adverse
health effects. Emissions of VOC are considered, along with NOx, to be the main precursors of
photochemical air pollution. Finally, man-made CO2 emissions are mainly due to the burning of
fossil fuels. The World Health Organization reports that the atmospheric concentration of CO2
has increased by more than 30% since pre-industrial times. This disturbs the balance of the
earth’s radiative energy budget. It is associated with an increase in the earth’s surface temper-
ature and is related to effects on climate, sea level rise and world agriculture. CO2 contributes
the largest share to global warming (OECD 2004).
Table 3 (see columns 1 to 5) and Figure 3 summarize the variation in emissions across coun-
tries and over time. We can see that the variation across countries (and also across categories
within countries) is in fact more pronounced than the variation over time. Interestingly, many
countries perform quite well in one category, but emit well above average in other categories.
For instance, Norway has below average per capita emissions of SOx and CO2. It is, however, by
far the biggest per capita emitter of VOC. Its 76.19 tons per 1, 000 capita are more than twice
that of the sample average. Greece is the biggest per capita emitter of SOx, but in all other
categories it is below average. Luxembourg (almost an outlier) is a huge per capita emitter of
CO, CO2, NOx, and VOC. Sweden, on the other hand, performs quite well in all categories.
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 about here]
7Ideally, one would like to use the actually relevant impact for individuals. To the extent that we find emissions
to be negatively associated with SWD, this effect, therefore, also captures the positive non-use value of lower
emissions. Even that, however, ignores the possibility that for individuals living at the border to another country,
that other country’s policies and outcomes may be more relevant than the home country’s policies.
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Arguably, traffic, and in particular congestion, plays a major role in day-to-day perceptions
of environmental quality. To capture the quality and the extent of the road network in relation
to the stock of passenger cars and all other motor vehicles (basically trucks) we construct three
variables based on information collected from the OECD Environmental Data Compendium
2004. We use (i) the number of passenger cars per kilometer of the total road network and (ii)
the number of trucks per kilometer of the total road network. Moreover, (iii), since the road
network can be divided into ‘normal’ roads and highways, we calculate the share of highways
of the total road network and include this variable as a control for the structure of the road
network. Columns 6 to 8 of Table 3 and Figure 4 provide descriptive statistics for these three
variables. There is substantial variation across countries for all three measures. Moreover, in
general, we observe a (rather modest) upward trend in congestion and in the share of highways.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
2.3 Control variables
2.3.1 Country-level
To control for various determinants of SWD other than environmental factors, we employ a set
of (economic) control variables. Better economic performance is most likely associated with
higher SWD. As proxies for the overall economic performance we use real GDP per capita,
the real GDP growth rate, the inflation (price level of consumption), and the annual deficit.
Moreover, we include openness (exports plus imports divided by real GDP), the total receipts
of the government as a percentage of GDP, population size, and index of the degree of electoral
fractionalization of the party-system.8
2.3.2 Individual-level covariates
It is common in studies of SWD to also include demographic variables. We include a set of
socio-economic control variables capturing: age, sex, family status, education, and labor market
status. Clearly, we would have preferred to control for income, also on the individual level.
8In particular, we use the index proposed by Rae (1968) that is defined as 1 −∑n
i=1
v2i , where vi is the
share of votes for party i and n the number of parties. That means, a higher value of this Rae-Index indicates
a more fractionalized system. Note that, because all our countries are democracies, controlling for the extent
of democracy is not likely to yield added insights. We also included the institutional quality indices found by
Wagner et al. (2009) to be correlated with SWD. Whilst this substantially reduces the number of observations,
the overall results remain similar and are available on request. Details on data sources for all control variables
are provided in the Data Appendix. Descriptive statistics are available upon request.
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However, this information is not available for several years and several countries. In any case,
education (captured by school leaving age) and labor market status (where we compare employed
citizens to unemployed, self-employed, and those out of the labor force) arguably proxy well for
income.
2.4 Empirical strategy
Our empirical approach is simple. We run regressions with individual SWD as the dependent
variable and our key environmental variables as well as control variables (on an individual and a
country level) as explanatory variables. Specifically, due to the nature of the dataset we are able
to employ a panel regression, and include country and year fixed effects. Since our dependent
variable SWD is measured on a four-point scale, we estimate an ordered logit model.
Two aspects of this empirical approach merit comments. First, note that to explore the effect
of environmental policy and environmental quality on SWD, we have to deal with data measured
on two different levels. While we observe SWD on an individual level, we measure environmental
policy and environmental quality on a country-level.9 Moulton (1990) drew economists’ atten-
tion to the fact that applying standard estimation methods in this setup can lead to standard
errors that are biased downward. Early work tried to meet this challenge by using averaged
data. But this ignores heterogeneity on the individual level and assumes homogenous policy
effects. Moreover, it reduces the degrees of freedom substantially and requires the cardinality
of satisfaction scores. We instead wish to make full use of the information contained on the in-
dividual level. Therefore, we follow standard practice and calculate Huber (1967)-White (1980)
standard errors robust to clustering on the country-year level (Froot 1989; Williams 2000).10
The second issue we highlight is that of causality. If we observe a statistically significant
coefficient on environmental policy in a regression explaining SWD, this does not necessarily
mean that environmental policy causes higher SWD. To make a clean causal statement, we
would need truly exogenous variation, i. e., random assignment of environmental policies across
countries. In fact, however, policy is also endogenous. There are two broad classes of endogeneity
concerns: reverse causation and omitted variables. It appears somewhat unlikely that there is
reverse causation from SWD to environmental policy. But we cannot completely exclude the
9In fact, we would prefer individual-level data for environmental policy and environmental quality, but this
sort of data does not exist, at least not in a dataset that measures individuals’ SWD.
10Country-level regressions, where we use average SWD as the dependent variable and regress it on our envi-
ronmental policy measures, all country-level control variables used in the paper, as well as country and year fixed
effects, give overall similar results.
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possibility that some other omitted (and perhaps unobservable) factors are correlated with both
SWD and environmental policy. While this is a concern that is not to be taken lightly, we note
that by including many (time-varying) control variables, we ameliorate this concern to a large
extent. The longitudinal component of the dataset is also particulary useful in another way:
Since we include fixed effects on a country level we control also for all unobserved time-invariant
factors. Overall, this control strategy facilitates, though does not completely guarantee, a causal
interpretation of our results.11
3 Estimation results
Our primary results for environmental policy are presented in Table 4, and those for environ-
mental quality are presented in Table 5. In order to provide interpretable estimation output,
we report – besides the coefficients (βk) and the standard errors – standardized coefficients and
changes in the predicted probabilities. Coefficients rescaled by their standard deviation (hence-
forth denoted by σ) enable a simple interpretation just like coefficients for the linear regression
model. For non-binary explanatory variables we report the fully standardized coefficients, given
by βSfk = σkβk/σSWD∗ , which can be interpreted as the standard deviation increase in SWD
by each standard deviation increase in the respective explanatory variable, holding all other
variables constant. In the case of binary explanatory variables we report the standardized coef-
ficients, given by βSk = βk/σSWD∗ , that gives the estimated ceteris paribus standard deviation
increase in SWD when the binary explanatory variable switches from zero to one. For the
variables of primary interest we report in addition the predicted probabilities of being ‘not at
all satisfied’ (m = 1), ‘not very satisfied’ (m = 2), ‘fairly satisfied’ (m = 3) and ‘very satis-
fied’ (m = 4) due to a discrete change in the respective covariate by half of a standard deviation
holding all other covariates at their mean (x¯), that is, ∆Pr(SWD = m|x¯)/∆xk.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
11In a predecessor working paper, we employed an alternative empirical strategy, namely a hierarchical (multi-
level) model. The original paper, which used only a cross-sectional dataset, will remain available. Unfortunately,
a hybrid of the two approaches (fixed effects and hierarchical modeling) is still an underdeveloped area of econo-
metric research (Kim and Frees 2006). While, broadly speaking, the results in the original paper were similar to
the present one, the richer data and the empirical strategy employed here – in particular the ability to control
for country fixed effects – imply that the present results should be seen as more reliable.
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3.1 Individual and country-level characteristics
We begin by briefly commenting on our control variables. As regards the individual-level char-
acteristics, it is worth noting that we find very robust effects. That is, the qualitative and
quantitative results concerning the demographic covariates are rather similar across all specifi-
cations. Substantively, we find that females have a significantly lower level of SWD. Holding
all other covariates constant, specification (I) in Table 4 suggests that their SWD is 0.013 stan-
dard deviations lower than that of male respondents.12 With respect to age we find an inverted
U-shaped relationship. Young citizens (i. e., between 15 and 24 years of age, the base group)
have a comparably high SWD. Thereafter, we observe a decrease in SWD with rising age. This
downward trend, however, reverses for citizens in the highest age group (i. e., 65 years of age and
older). To some extent, this suggests that SWD decreases over the period of working life (when
citizens contribute most in terms of taxes). Married citizens are on average more satisfied (plus
0.053 standard deviations). The coefficients of the variables capturing the individual economic
status are mainly statistically significant. As expected, unemployed citizens are – compared
to employed citizens – less satisfied (minus 0.280 standard deviations). Somewhat surprisingly,
self-employed individuals are also comparably less satisfied with the way democracy works (mi-
nus 0.022 standard deviations). It is, for instance, possible that entrepreneurial citizens would
on average appreciate more possibilities for political involvement, or entrepreneurial activity per
se typically reveals certain shortcomings of the political system. Citizens out of the labor force
(i. e., the retired or housewives) do not exhibit a statistically significant different level of SWD
compared to employed citizens. Finally, satisfaction rises with education. Compared to the base
group of citizens with low educational attainment (i. e., below 16 years of formal education), the
SWD of citizens with a medium and a high education is higher by 0.034 and 0.086 standard
deviations, respectively. The highest level of SWD, however, is attained by currently enrolled
citizens; their SWD is even 0.128 standard deviations higher.
The results for the country-level characteristics are also instructive (see, for instance spec-
ification (II) in Table 4). Richer, faster-growing, smaller economies and those that run larger
deficits but have a smaller government revenue to GDP ratio have higher SWD. Openness and
SWD are negatively correlated. Inflation enters positively, which may have to do with the fact
that in the period under consideration, inflation in these countries was relatively moderate and
12It is outside the scope of this paper to determine whether or not this may be explained by discrimination of
women in various aspects of live, such as the labor market, but this would appear to be an important question
for further research.
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arguably related to economic growth.
3.2 Environmental policy
The primary finding of interest in Table 4 is the impact of our summary measure of environmental
policy on SWD. The strong and robust result that emerges is that, controlling for a large variety
of individual and country-level explanatory variables, a more developed environmental policy is
applauded by citizens. The summary measure enters as a statistically significant determinant of
SWD. Specification (II) suggest that an increase in the number of implemented policy measures
by one standard deviation (which is equal to 3.78 policies) increases SWD by 0.09 standard
deviations (which is equal to 0.075 points). Equivalently, the probability that a citizen is ‘fairly
satisfied’ (‘very satisfied’) with the way democracy works is 2.9 (1.3) percentage points higher
if the number of implemented policy measures increases by half of a standard deviation. This
quantitative effect is comparable to that of real GDP growth. The average marginal effect (not
tabulated) of these two variables is about the same: An additional environmental policy measure
implemented, or an increase in GDP growth by one percentage point both increases SWD by
0.006 points. Compared to the gender-gap in SWD, an additional environmental policy measure
creates an average effect seven times as big as this gap.
Notably, the results on the effect of summary measure of environmental policy on SWD
remain unchanged when controlling for the share of green parties in the cabinet, as in the spec-
ification (III) of Table 4. This is important because the green parties’ percentages of total
cabinet posts can be interpreted as time-varying proxies for the degree of environmental aware-
ness. Specification (IV) finally introduces fiscal activities of the government with respect to
environmental policies; note here the sample size is reduced considerably. Still, even when we
control for environmental taxes and expenditures in this smaller sample, the effect of summary
measure of environmental policy is present and significant (p-value of 0.09). We also tested
whether the effect of the summary measure changes over time (i. e., we introduced interaction
terms between year fixed effects and the summary measure). While we find that the effect is sig-
nificantly different in various years, no clear long-run trend is visible. These results are available
upon request.13
13In untabulated regressions, we have considered “kitchen-sink" regressions including binary variables for all
the individual policy measures. Only few individual policy measures are consistently positively or negatively
related with SWD; instead, the sign (and significance) often depends on the introduction of additional controls.
Significance of individual measures may also arise simply as an artefact due to the correlations between the many
policy variables included in the horserace. While the summary measure is, by definition, a cruder proxy for
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In line with the estimated positive effect of our summary measure of environmental policy
on SWD, we find that citizens’ SWD increases with public expenditures on the environment.
An increase in expenditures by one standard deviation (0.272 percentage points of GDP) is
associated with an 0.062 standard deviation increase in SWD. The estimated average marginal
effect (i. e., the effect of an increase of expenditures by one percentage point of GDP) is equal to
0.055 points. With respect to environmental taxes we find a negative effect on SWD. One could
have expected that environmental taxes might have a positive effect on SWD due to the potential
double dividend they offer in the form of a reduction of negative externalities and a reduction of
other distortionary taxes. However, our results do not support this prediction. Instead, citizens
seem to find only government intervention through enhanced spending appropriate, but SWD
is ceteris paribus lower when environmental taxes are higher. Our estimation suggests that an
increase in environmental taxes by one standard deviation decreases SWD by 0.073 standard
deviations. The average marginal effect is 0.025 points. The positive effects of the summary
measure and the expenditures, in combination with the negative effect of taxes, are consistent
with an economic understanding of environmental problems as collective action problems, i. e.,
with the notion that most individuals care about the environment but few are willing to pay the
costs to protect it. Overall, we interpret our findings as substantial support for the Hypothesis
1 that more environmental policy increases SWD.
3.3 Environmental quality
The second hypothesis that we test is that environmental quality should be positively associated
with SWD. Table 5 shows the results for this hypothesis, first introducing various categories of
emissions, then introducing three measures of traffic and congestion, and then including all
measures (along with the share of green parties in the cabinet). A number of interesting findings
emerge from studying these sets of variables both individually and jointly.
Across all specifications we find negative coefficients for the emissions of sulphur oxides
(SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and carbon monoxide (CO). However, only the estimated effects
of nitrogen oxides are statistically significant throughout. An increase in emissions of nitrogen
oxides by one standard deviation decreases SWD by about 0.1 to 0.15 standard deviations. The
estimated positive effect of emissions of volatile organic compounds (V OC) and carbon dioxide
(CO2) are puzzling. It seems that these categories of emissions are correlated in Specification (I)
environmental policy, results obtained with it are more stable.
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with unobserved time-varying SWD-enhancing mobility factors. After controlling for traffic and
congestion in Specification (III) and (IV), at least the statistical significance of carbon dioxide
vanishes.
With respect to our measures of traffic and congestions we find a positive effect for the car-
road ratio, and a robust negative effect for the truck-road ratio. It seems that citizens value their
personal mobility (in terms of having a car) quite highly, and even accept a high car-road ratio
(i. e., a higher likelihood of congestion). By contrast, they perceive a high incidence of trucks
(heavy goods vehicle) as unpleasant and they appreciate governmental activities to reduce this
heavy traffic. Especially the latter result is plausible, given the significant amount of public
discussion of this topic in some countries. (See, for example, the transit traffic conflict between
the Austrian government and the EU).
In summary, the results on environmental quality are not as strong as those on environmental
policy and provide only weak evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. Citizens may be less informed
about environmental quality (captured for instance by emissions) and/or may hold the domestic
political system less responsible for environmental protection within this domain, since they
perceive it as a more global phenomenon where national action is less effective.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
3.4 Life satisfaction
Our equivalent analysis of the effect of environmental policy on LS is summarized in the upper
panel of Table 6, while the results for environmental quality are summarized in the lower panel.
For environmental quality, we obtain, overall, the same patterns as for SWD. As for policy, we
can see that the summary measure of environmental policy has also a statistically significant
positive effect on LS. However, this effect is somewhat smaller and less robust. In Specifica-
tions (I) through (III) the estimated effect is highly statistically significant, and suggests that
an increase of the summary measure by one standard deviation increases LS by up to 0.080
standard deviations. In Specification (IV), where we include environmental taxes and expendi-
tures as additional covariates, however, statistical significance vanishes and the estimated effect
is basically zero. Likewise, we find a smaller (and less significant) effect of public environmental
expenditures on LS. The average marginal effect is about 0.025. Environmental taxes turn out
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to be no significant determinant of LS. Overall, we interpret these results as evidence that SWD
and LS are related but distinct concepts. In our context we find a stronger relationship between
SWD and (environmental) policy measures. This finding seems plausible since SWD refers to
the current political situation, while LS is an all-encompassing evaluation of individuals’ current
life conditions.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
3.5 Heterogenous effects
To operationalize causal heterogeneity with respect to the impact of environmental measures on
SWD, and to test Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c, we split the sample along the dimensions of age,
parenthood, and educational attainment.
With respect to age, we distinguish between young (below 34 years of age) and old (at least
55 years of age) citizens. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer does not include a specific question
on parenthood. However, respondents are asked (in 90 usable country-years) ‘How many children
under 15 are there living at home? ’.14 Given that, in almost all cases, mothers obtain (physical)
custody after divorce (or separation) this question can be used to construct valid information
on parenthood for women. Therefore, when we refer to parents we distinguish between female
parents and female non-parents. To explore the effect among low and highly educated citizens
we compare estimations based on a sample of citizens with 15 years of formal education or less,
and citizens with at least 16 years of formal education.15 Since we cannot control for income
in our full sample, educational attainment incorporates not only the effect of education but
(potentially) also the effect of income.
Table 7 provides the results. Consider first the upper panel, where the first two columns of
Table 7 compare the effects of environmental measures on SWD for young and old citizens. A
comparison of the standardized estimates (and their significance) indicates that younger citizens
care comparably more about environmental policy. For instance, an increase in the summary
measure by one standard deviation, increases SWD of young citizens by 0.070 standard devi-
ations, and those of older citizens by only 0.056 standard deviations. The next two columns
14To be precise, in a subset of waves the survey differentiates further between young (below 8 years of age) and
old (above 8 and below 15 years of age) children.
15The data allow us to consistently distinguish between citizens who are still studying (8.9%), who have up
to 15 years (29.04%), who have between 16 and 19 years (37.68%), and who have 20 or more years of formal
education (24.37%).
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differentiate between parents and non-parents. While the estimated effect of our summary
measure of environmental policy is not statistically significant (at conventional levels) in either
sample, it is remarkable that the estimated coefficient is three times larger for parents and has a
smaller standard error. With respect to environmental expenditures we find that in the case of
parents each standard deviation increase in these expenditures increases SWD by 0.105 standard
deviations. This effect is highly statistically significant. The equivalent effect for non-parents is
only 0.066 standard deviations. Comparing low and highly educated citizens, we find a compa-
rable stronger effect of the summary measure in the latter sample (0.092 versus 0.029).16 We
find similar patterns in an equivalent analysis of LS (not shown).
Overall, we interpret these findings on heterogenous effects as broadly, though not extremely
strongly, supportive for Hypotheses 3a through 3c as far as environmental policy is concerned.
By contrast, our analysis of heterogenous effects of environmental quality on SWD (and LS)
does not yield important differences between the sub-groups of citizens under consideration.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates satisfaction with democracy in the presence of an especially important
and topical collective action problem, the environment. Our first set of new results shows that,
overall, a focus on environmental policy is associated with greater SWD in statistically and
economically important ways in our sample of 16 European countries across a period of up to
25 years. Higher public expenditures on the environment tend to increase an average citizen’s
satisfaction score, while taxes ceteris paribus reduce it. The findings for environmental quality
are more ambivalent. Broadly speaking, parents, young citizens and those with high education
worry significantly more about appropriate environmental policy than do non-parents, older
citizens, and those with low education. These results are intuitive and should be of interest to
scholars (including those studying collective action problems other than those problems related
to the environment) and policy-makers alike.
Although our paper thus makes progress on the important question of how the environment
matters for citizens’ SWD issues, it also has its limitations. Perhaps the primary drawback is
16If we redefine the group of highly educated citizens to comprise those with 20 or more years of formal
education (instead of 16 or more years), the effect of the summary measure even increases to 0.131.
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that we are not offering a theoretical framework that neatly pins down exactly which variables
should play a role for SWD and which should not. This issue is partly addressed by our panel
data setup that allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. But even that
approach does not completely exclude the possibility that time-varying omitted variables are
driving some of our results. Further theoretical and conceptual work on SWD can, therefore, be
fruitfully conducted.
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Data appendix
The information on the individual-level variables satisfaction with democracy, life satisfaction,
age, sex, family status, education, labor market status, and children is from theMannheim Euro-
barometer Trend File, 1970-2002. This dataset is prepared by the Zentralarchiv fur Empirische
Sozialforschung (Hermann Schmitt and Evi Scholz) and, for instance, available as ICPSR Study
No. 4357. We start with all observations for which a measure of satisfaction with democracy
is available (see Table 1). In our estimation analysis, however, we cannot exploit the full set of
observations, since information on some covariates is missing. Information on age enters into
the estimations based on binary variables for six age-groups (15 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to
54, 55 to 64, and over 65 years) where the youngest group serves as a base group. Family status
is captured by a binary variable equal to one if the respondent is married, and zero otherwise.
Educational attainment is incorporated based on binary variables capturing if a respondent is
still enrolled, has below 15 years of formal education (base group), between 16 and 19 years, or
more than 20 years. With respect to the labor market status we distinguish between respondents
who are employed (base group), self-employed, unemployed and out of the labor force.
The information on the country-level covariates is from different sources. First, infor-
mation on real GDP per capita (in constant prices), the real GDP growth rate (percentage
change from previous year), inflation (price level of consumption), openness (exports plus im-
ports divided by real GDP per capita; all measured in constant prices), and population size
(in thousands) is from the Penn World Tables (version 7.0). Further information is provided
by http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. Second, the information on tax receipts (total tax receipts
of government as a percentage of GDP), the annual deficit (government primary balance) as
a percentage of GDP, and the index of electoral fractionalization of the party-system (follow-
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ing Rae 1968), green parties’ percentages of total cabinet posts (weighted by days) are from
the Comparative Political Data Set I, 1960-2008 provided by Klaus Armingeon, Sarah Engler,
Panajotis Potolidis, Marléne Gerber and Philipp Leimgruber; see http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/
content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html.
Our measures of environmental policy are from two different sources. First, informa-
tion on the existence of a quota for electricity from renewable energy sources, an energy/CO2
tax, a packaging rules, a sustainability council, a subsidy for electricity from renewable en-
ergy sources, energy efficiency labels, an environmental plan, ecolabels, an environmental office,
an environmental expert council, a general environmental act, environmental reporting rules,
a waste disposal act, environmental protection as a constitutional goal, a nature conservancy
act, and a soil protection act is collected from Binder (2002). We obtained the information by
reading them from the graphs. The graphs are fortunately of the quality that they allow the
unambiguous identification of all cases. Second, data on revenues from environmental taxes and
government expenditure on environment protection (both measured as a percentage of GDP)
are from the database of Eurostat. (Data were retrieved on 2011/04/18.)
Our measures of environmental quality are from two primary sources. Firstly, the infor-
mation on emissions of SOx, NOx, CO, VOC and CO2 from energy use is collected from the
OECD Environmental Data, Compendium 2004. Secondly, the information on the road network
(total length of road networks, length of highways) and on the stock of road vehicles (total
number of passenger cars in use, total number of other motor vehicles in use) is obtained from
the OECD Environmental Data, Compendium 2006/2007.
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